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COMMENTS
TRADE REGULATIONS: CUSTOMER AND
TERRITORIAL RESTRICTIONS
A number of legal problems have arisen through manufacturers
efforts to restrict competition within their distribution system by regu-
lating the territories in which their distributors may sell, and the types
of customers to whom they may sell. The purpose of this article is to
analyze the present status of customer and protected territory distribu-
tion restrictions and to inquire into the future of these regulations.
A discussion on customer and territorial restrictions must commence
with the case of White Motor Co. v. United States." White Motor Com-
pany manufactured and sold trucks directly to dealers. White's agree-
ment with its distributors included a clause whereby the dealers agreed
to sell only within a certain defined territory, and also agreed not to sell
any trucks to individuals, firms, or corporations which did not have a
place of business and/or a purchasing headquarters in the territory. In
addition, the dealers were prohibited from selling the trucks to any
federal or state government, or any department or political subdivision
thereof, unless the right to do so was specifically granted by White
Motor Company in writing. The district court granted summary judg-
ment for the Government, holding that both the territorial restrictions
and the customer restrictions were per se illegal.2 However, the United
States Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case to the district
court for trial. The Government had argued before the Supreme Court
that a vertical arrangement by a manufacturer which restricted the ter-
ritory of his dealer was akin to a horizontal arrangement among com-
petitors to divide territories. In answer to this the Court said:
We are asked to extend the holding in Timken Roller Bearing
Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 95 L. Ed. 1199, 79 S. Ct. 971,
supra (which banned horizontal arrangement among competitors
to divide territory), to a vertical arrangement by one manufac-
turer restricting the territory of his distributors or dealers. We
intimate no view one way or the other on the legality of such an
arrangement, for we believe that the applicable rule of law
should be designed after a trial.3
The Court further stated:
This is the first case involving a territorial restriction in a
vertical arrangement; and we know too little of the actual im-
pact both of that restriction and the one respecting customers
to reach a conclusion on the bare bones of the documentary evi-
dence before us.4
'White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
2 White Motor Co. v. United States, 194 F. Supp. 562 (N.D. Ohio 1961).
3 White Motor Co. v. United States, supra note 1, at 261.
4 Ibid.
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Thus, the White Motor case falls far short of laying down any definitive
rules concerning customer or territorial restraints. The Court intimated
no view as to whether these restrictions are per se illegal or whether
they are to be governed by the rule of reason. In actuality, all the Court
decided was that they did not want to decide this issue on an appeal
from a summary judgment.
Only one case has reached the courts since the Supreme Court de-
cided the White case. In Snap-On Tools Corporation v. Federal Trade
Commission,5 the complaint brought against this manufacturer of hand
tools and related equipment charged the company with unfair acts and
practices and unfair methods of competition in violation of section 5
of the Federal Trade Commission Act 6 on the ground that Snap-On Tool
dealership contracts limited and suppressed competition by fixing re-
sale prices, geographically restricting markets, limiting customers, and
restricting dealer's right to compete after ceasing to be dealersT The
hearing examiner dismissed the complaint for failure to establish a
prima facie case. On appeal the Commission reversed the examiner and
issued an order requiring the petitioner to cease and desist from en-
gaging in each of the challenged practices." The Commission did not
strike down each of these practices individually, but rather ruled that
they were illegal because they formed a part of a general plan or scheme
which was unlawful. On appeal, the Commission's ruling was reversed,
and the examiner's decision reinstated.9 In holding that Snap-On Tools
did not violate the anti-trust laws, the circuit court refused to treat the
violations as part of a general scheme, but considered each violation
separately. Although the court upheld both the territorial and customer
restrictions, these restrictions factually differed from those in the White
Motor case. Under the territorial restrictions, the dealers were allowed
to sell only in certain specified territories. However, as was pointed out
by the court, the dealers were free even under this provision to sell to
any customer, regardless of the customer's permanent location, who
wished to come to the dealer's assigned territory. These territorial re-
strictions were upheld on the basis that they were prompted by reason-
able business expectations and were beneficial both to the manufacturer
and the public because of their promotion of interbrand competition.
5 Snap-On Tools Corporation v. Federal Trade Commission, 321 F. 2d 825 (7th
Cir. 1963). See also In Sandura Co., FTC Docket No. 7042, 3 CCH Trade
Reg. Rep. 516,095 (1962).
638 Stat. 719 (1914), 15 U.S.C. 45 (1958).
7The fact that Snap-On Tools Company was prosecuted under §5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act, while White Motors was prosecuted under
§1 and §3 of the Sherman Act creates no important difference. The courts
have generally given a broader interpretation to the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act, holding that many violations of the Sherman Act are also viola-
tions of the Federal Trade Commission Act.
8 Snap-On Tools Corp., FTC Docket No. 7116, 3 CCH Trade Reg. Rep. 515,546
(1961).
9 Snap-On Tools Corporation v. Federal Trade Commission, supra note 5.
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The court felt this justified the minimum curtailment of intrabrand
competition. The customer restrictions also differed from White in that
there were only a few occasional oral understandings between a branch
manager and dealer that large industrial accounts would be reserved for
the company's salesmen. The court felt that at most this was a de
minimus restrain on competition; in actuality the accounts were too
large or complex for a normally trained dealer with his limited inventory
to handle properly. Thus, in the first case decided by the courts since
the White Motor case, the court refused to adopt a rule of per se illegal-
ity, and felt that in applying the rule of reason, the restraints were not
unreasonable.
TERRITORIAL RESTRICTIONS
The circuit court in the Snap-On Tools case used language which
implied that the United States Supreme Court had held in the White
case that territorial restricts were not per se illegal. Eventually, these
territorial restrictions may be declared not to be per se illegal and in-
stead subject to the rule of reason. But, such a conclusion cannot be
reached on the basis of the Supreme Court's decision in White, since
the Supreme Court merely postponed its decision on the legality of
territorial restrictions until a trial could be had on the issues.
Thus, since there is still a possibility that these clauses may be de-
clared illegal per se, the question of what makes a restraint of trade
per se illegal is important. The Supreme Court has stated that the re-
straints which fall into the class of per se illegality are made up of:
Agreements or practices which because of their pernicious
effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are con-
clusively presumed to be unreasonable and, therefore, illegal
without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused
or the business excuse for their use."0
Among the practices which the Court has deemed to be unlawful in
and of themselves are: price fixing, both vertical (United States v.
Parke, Davis & Co)11 and horizontal (United States v. Socony-Vacuum
Oil Co. Inc.), 2 division of markets among competitors (Tiinken Roller
Bearing Co. v. United States), 3 group boycotts (Fashion Originators
Guild of America, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission),'4 and tying ar-
rangements (International Salt Co. Inc. v. United States). 5 It seems
10 Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
"I United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960).
"2United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., Inc., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
13Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
14Fashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission,
312 U.S. 457 (1941).
'5 International Salt Co., Inc. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947). Even where
the Court has created a rule of per se illegality, certain practices may not
fall into that category. For example, in the area of tie-in sales, there is no
illegality if the seller has no control over the tying product, since he really
has no way to pressure the buyer into taking the tied product.
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readily apparent that all of these practices have the pernicious effect of
restraining competition, while being of no benefit to anyone other than
the companies entering into such restraints. But can the same be said
about territorial confinement clauses? It appears that to answer this
question the Court must analyze three points: the manufacturer's pur-
pose for entering into these restrictions; the effect of these restrictions
on interbrand competition; and alternate arrangements between the sup-
pliers and distributors which might satisfy the same business purposes
as territorial confinement, and yet interfere less with competition.
Probably the main reason why manufacturers insert clauses re-
stricting the territory in which a dealer may sell is that the manufacturer
feels that such a restriction is necessary for the orderly marketing of
his products, so that he may compete more effectively. A manufacturer
is anxious for his distributor to devote his full time and effort to devel-
oping sales in his own territory; the assumption being that a dealer
who raids the territory of another is not fully developing his own ter-
ritory. Moreover, when a dealer's territory has been invaded by another
dealer, he very likely will retaliate in the same manner and with the
result of dealer competing against dealer. And since the product is the
same, the only way one can compete against the other is to cut prices.
More important, when the dealers are actively competing against each
other, the overall effect may be to decrease interbrand competition.
A second reason why manufacturers claim they must restrict the
territories in which their dealers may sell is that, by so doing, their deal-
ers are assured a sufficient market. In certain industries where a dealer
requires a very large initial investment, the dealer himself wants an
added protection for this investment, or else he may not take the risk
involved. Thus, merely to obtain a suitable dealership force, the manu-
facturer might be required to include territorial restrictions in all of
his dealership agreements.
By assuring the dealer a sufficient market for his product through
the use of territorial restrictions, the manufacturer is also in a better
position to obtain certain concessions for which he is unable to contract
by law. For example, by assuring a dealer a sufficient market, he may
be discouraged from handling competing lines, though a manufacturer
could not legally impose such a restriction on his dealer under section 3
of the Clayton Act.16
The main question which still remains unanswered is whether these
business purposes should be allowed to overcome the effect of territorial
restrictions, i.e., a restraint on intrabrand competition. No one can say
how the Supreme Court will ultimately decide this issue, but it is this
writer's opinion that if the choice is merely between an orderly market-
ing of goods without intrabrand competition or disorderly competition,
16 Clayton Anti-Trust Act §3, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. 14 (1958).
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the latter should prevail. But, if it can be shown that though these re-
straints limit intrabrand competition, they are nonetheless necessary
in order to have effective interbrand competition, territory restrictions
should be upheld. The impetus to interbrand competition must be
stressed by proponents of territorial restrictions to stay clear of the
rule of per se illegality.17
The question of alternative arrangements which are less likely to
violate the anti-trust laws is important in two respects. If the Supreme
Court feels there are less restrictive alternative arrangements, they
could use this as a basis for declaring territorial restrictions per se
illegal on the ground that the device adopted should be no more re-
strictive than necessary to fulfill the purpose. And even if they are not
declared per se illegal, the fact that there is an agreement which restricts
competition makes such a clause subject to the rule of reason under
sections 1 and 3 of the Sherman Act.'8
The manufacturer's safest alternative would be to integrate into the
distribution phase of his own business, i.e. to act as manufacturer,
wholesaler and retailer. This should raise no anti-trust problems, un-
less the company would come within the monopoly restriction of section
2 of the Sherman Act.' 9 However, numerous economic and legal diffi-
culties are created in areas such as taxation, doing business require-
ments, increased supervision, etc. Additionally, this is such a large un-
dertaking that most manufacturers could not afford this extreme.20
The manufacturer could set up agency agreements with the dealers,
and then impose territorial restraints on the dealers.2 ' Agency arrange-
ments would probably remove the danger of the anti-trust laws, but
they create new problems in and of themselves.
To have valid territorial restrictions in an agency contract,
care must be taken to have true agency relationship between the
supplier and its distributor. Extremely important to the validity
of the agency agreement is the retention in the supplier of title
17 The Commission in the Snap-On Tools case stated that even if the exclusive
territorial agreements were necessary for the orderly marketing of its pro-
ducts, the public is entitled to the benefit of competition on the dealer level.
Some strength was given to this statement by Dr. Miles Medical Company
v. John D. Park & Sons Company, 220 U.S. 373 (1911) where it was stated:
"The complainant having sold its product at prices satisfactory to itself, the
public is entitled to whatever advantage may be derived from competition in
the subsequent traffic." The circuit court answered this by saying that the
public was also entitled to keen competition among differing brands of products
such as was sought to be promoted by Snap-On Tools.
28 Sherman Anti-Trust Act §1 and §3, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. 1, 3 (1958).
19 Sherman Anti-Trust Act §2, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. 2 (1958).
20 It seems rather paradoxical to say that this is a safe alternative. The anti-
trust laws were created to increase free competition, but when the manu-
facturer takes over the distribution of his own product, this result is stultified
since there is a complete elimination of intra-brand competition.
21 See United States v. General Electric Company, 272 U.S. 476 (1926) and
Federal Trade Commission v. Curtis Publishing Company, 260 U.S. 568
(1923).
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to the product. In this respect, mere designation of title is not
enough. The economic burdens of ownership must remain on
the supplier. For example, payment by the supplier of casualty
insurance premiums and property taxes on the goods; payment
by the agent to the supplier for the goods only after sale to the
ultimate consumer; the right of the distributor to return unsold
goods; shipment by the supplier of goods sold by the agent di-
rectly to the purchaser; and the absence of competition between
agent and principal all point toward a true agency relationship.
On the other hand, failure to police agents properly; failure of
the agent to account to the principal for its products; and pay-
ment by the agent for the product prior to delivery to the ultimate
consumer may give an argument that no true agency agreement
exists.
Use of an agency method of distribution thus shifts substan-
tial economic burdens from the distributor to the supplier. The
entire cost of inventory maintenance and substantial accounting
and policing costs are put on the supplier.
In addition to economic burdens, the agency system of dis-
tribution shifts to the supplier certain legal burdens. Thus, the
supplier may be liable in tort or contract to the ultimate consumer
for the material misrepresentations of its agent-distributor con-
cerning warranties or suitability of the product. Or, having
avoided the Sherman Act limitations on territorial restrictions,
the supplier may find that the use of agents in itself may create
problems under the Robinson-Patman Act. If, for example, the
supplier has given its agents some discretion as to price and if
these agents should differ as to the price at which they sell to
competing customers, the supplier may find that by virtue of
establishing a unitary organization for purposes of being able to
regulate intrabrand competition, he has by that very unity cre-
ated customer price differentials in violation of the Robinson-
Patman Act.2 2 (Citations omitted.)
A manufacturer could also use an exclusive distributorship agree-
ment alone, i.e., not combining the exclusive distributorship with a
territory restriction. This type of agreement appears to be valid, as long
as the seller is not dominant in the market and the agreement is limited
in terms of scope and duration.2 3 This arrangement gives the dealer a
certain measure of protection, and should result in a dealer giving more
time and effort to developing his own territory.2 4
22 Stewart, Exclusive Franchises and Territorial Confinement of Distributors, 22
A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECroN 39,40 (1963).23 See White Motor Co. v. United States, supra note 1, at note 11 to Justice
Brennan's concurring opinion; Schwing Motor Co. v. Hudson Sales Corp.,
138 F. Supp. 899 (D. Md.), aff'd per curium, 239 F. 2d 176 (4th Cir. 1956),
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 823 (1957); Packard Motor Car Co. v. Webster Motor
Co., 243 F. 2d 418 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 822 (1957) ; Robinson,
Restraints on Trade and the Orderly Marketing of Goods, 45 CORNELL L. Q.
254, 255-261 (1960).
24 If the manufacturer's article is a small, everyday household item, this seems
to be an entirely satisfactory arrangement, since purchasers generally do not
leave their community to buy such products. But if the item is a costly one
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The restriction used in the Snap-On Tools case brings up an inter-
esting question. In White Motor Company, the agreement not only pro-
hibited a dealer from selling outside his territory, but also pro-
hibited him from selling to anyone not having a place of business and/or
a purchasing headquarters in his territory. However, the restriction in
Snap-On Tools, although prohibiting the dealer from selling outside
his territory, did not prohibit the dealer from selling to customers who
came to him, even though they may have been located outside his terri-
tory. This type of provision is less restrictive than that used by White
Motor Company since the dealer is allowed to sell to people living out-
side his territory. The question still remains, however, whether or not
this makes the restriction valid since the dealer is still restrained from
actively seeking sales in an area beyond his territorial limits.
After the justice department took its stand against the legality of
territorial restrictions, many consent judgments were entered into by
various companies which, though prohibiting a company from restricting
a territory beyond which a distributor could sell, allowed the seller to
designate a geographical area within which a distributor could agree
to devote his best efforts, or to designate a geographical area in which
a distributor would be primarily responsible for selling the company's
products.25 This "area of primary responsibility" doctrine allows the
supplier to promise that he will appoint no one else in a particular ter-
ritory, and to terminate the franchise agreement with any dealer who
doesn't devote his best efforts in the area or adequately represent the
supplier.
The legality of agreements based on this doctrine may eventually
depend on the outcome of the White case, i.e. if territory distribution
agreements are eventually struck down, the primary responsibility agree-
ments could also fall. But, it is this writer's opinion that these agree-
ments could be sustained on their own, because they temper the conflict
such as a truck (or a number of trucks) the buyer is more likely to "shop
around" in other territories.25 See United States v. Bastitch, Inc., TRADE REG. REP. (1958 Trade Cas.) 569,
207 (D.R.I. 1958); United States v. American Type Founders Co., TRADE
REG. REP. (1958 Trade Cas.) 569,065 (D.N.J. 1958) ; United States v. Philco
Corp., TRADE REG. REP. (1956 Trade Cas.) 568,409 (E.D. Pa. 1956); United
States v. Rudolph Wurlitzer Co., TRADE REG. REP. (1958 Trade Cas.) 569,011(W.D.N.Y. 1958).
The Wierlitzer consent judgment contains a typical primary responsibility
provision:
"Subject to the above subsections of this section IV, Wurlitzer may
exercise its rights from time to time to choose and select its distributors
and customers and to designate geographical areas within which a dis-
tributor may agree to devote his best efforts to the sale of coin-operated
phonographs and may terminate the contract of any distributor who
may fail to devote his best efforts to the sale in the area so designated
of coin-operated phonographs manufactured by Wurlitzer or to repre-
sent Wurlitzer adequately in said area, and the designation of geographical
areas for such specified purposes only shall not be considered a violation
of this section IV."
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between a manufacturer's business reasons for imposing territorial re-
strictions and the resultant decrease in intrabrand competition by al-
lowing a dealer to compete beyond his assigned territory, but only if
he has properly developed his own territory.
An interesting and fairly persuasive argument can also be advanced
to uphold the "area of primary responsibility" doctrine on the basis of
United States v. Colgate & Company.26 In this case, the manufacturer
sent lists of uniform prices to his dealers, and informed them that if
they failed to adhere to the stated prices, no further sales would be
made to them. In holding that this policy was not illegal the Court stated:
The purpose of the Sherman Act is to prohibit monopolies,
contracts and combinations which probably would unduly inter-
fere with free exercise of their rights by those engaged, or who
wish to engage, in trade and commerce-in a word to preserve
the right of freedom to trade. In the absence of any purpose to
create or maintain a monopoly, the act does not restrict the long
recognized right of trader or manufacturer engaged in an en-
tirely private business, freely to exercise his own independent
discretion as to parties with whom he will deal. And, of course,
he may announce in advance the circumstances under which he
will refuse to sell.2 7
However, since the Colgate case was handed down, numerous decisions
have narrowly limited its scope. See Federal Trade Commission v.
Beech-Nut Packing Company,28 United States v. Bausch & Lomb Op-
tical Co.,29 and the recent case of United States v. Parke, Dazis & Co. 3 0
In this latter case, the Court struck down the practice whereby a
manufacturer announced the price at which his product was to be sold,
told dealers that if they refused to abide by this price, he would no longer
deal with them, induced wholesalers to stop selling to retailers who dis-
regarded the stated price, and set up other methods of gathering in-
formation on those who did not abide by the stated practice. The Court
acknowledged the existence of the Colgate doctrine, but confined its
immunity to a mere announcement of the policy and a simple refusal
to deal. The Court stated:
Thus, whatever uncertainty previously existed as to the scope
of the Colgate doctrine, Bausch & Lomb and Beech-Nut plainly
fashioned its dimensions as meaning no more than that a simple
refusal to sell to customers who will not resell at prices sug-
gested by the seller is permissible under the Sherman Act. In
other words, an unlawful combination is not just such as arises
from a price maintenance agreement, express or implied; such a
combination is also organized if the producer secures adherence
26 United States v. Colgate & Company, 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
27 Id. at 307.
28Federal Trade Commission v. Beech-Nut Packing Company, 257 U.S. 441
(1922).29 United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1944).
3o United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960).
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to his suggested prices by means which go beyond his mere
declination to sell to a customer who will not observe his an-
nounced policy.
31
The holding in this case caused Justice Harlan to state in his dissenting
opinion: "I think that what the Court has really done here is to throw
the Colgate doctrine into disgard."'' 2
If there is any vitality remaining in the Colgate doctrine, a supplier
may be able to validly state in advance that he will refuse to deal with
his distributors unless they devote their best efforts to a certain area.
As long as there is no conduct on the part of the manufacturer or dis-
tributor implying any agreement to restrict the latter's activities to the
"area of primary responsibility," the manufacturer's unilateral refusal
to deal should be protected.
However, it must be noted that there are two disadvantages in cre-
ating areas of primary responsibility. The first one encompasses the
result which flows from a dealer selling beyond his territory when he
has failed to properly develop his own territory. It is clear, both under
the Colgate doctrine and under the consent decrees which the Govern-
ment has allowed, that if a dealer invades the territory of others with-
out properly developing his own, the only alternative for the manu-
facturer is to discontinue the franchise. If the manufacturer merely
warns the dealer and gives him another chance, the manufacturer has
then gone beyond a mere refusal to deal, and an agreement has arisen
which may be violative of, the Sherman Act.33 The second disadvantage
is that it tends to give a bonus to those dealers who can properly de-
velop their own territory. If a dealer does properly develop his territory,
31 Id. at 43.32United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., supra note 29, at 57 (dissenting opinion).3 3See 60 MicH. L. REv. 1006, 1009 n. 14 (1962). The author makes the following
suggestions to reduce the risk that distributor cooperation might evidence
an agreement or conspiracy to allocate territories:
"[Tihe manufacturer should take the following precautions: (1) He
should omit any reference to territorial restrictions as a condition of the
continuance of the franchise. Any suggestion that distributors restrict
their activities to a designated area should be contained in a clearly uni-
lateral declaration of the manufacturer's general policy, but the dis-
tributor should be free to decide whether or not to acquiesce therein.
In the Matter of Columbus Coated Fabrics Corp., 55 F.T.C. 1500 (1959).
(2) He should refrain from soliciting any assurances from nonconform-
ing distributors that they will adhere to the policy in the future, since
such assurances may imply an agreement between the manufacturer and
the distributor. United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29, 46(1960). (3) He should allow only his own employees and agents to in-
vestigate distributor activities, since any assistance by a distributor in
determining whether any distributor is violating the manufacturer's policy
is evidence of an implied agreement. United States v. Bausch & Lomb
Co., 321 U.S. 707, 723 (1944) ; FTC v. Beech-Nut Co., 257 U.S. 441, 445-
56 (1922.)"
The typical territorial restriction agreement avoids this problem by imposing
the less drastic remedy of "profit pass over." Thus, if a dealer invades the
territory of another he merely incurs an obligation to share the profit with
the dealer whose territory has been invaded.
1963-1964]
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the manufacturer cannot complain if the dealer branches out into other
territories. Naturally, this could tend to create dissension among those
dealers who are being invaded. Notwithstanding these disadvantages,
the "area of primary responsibility" doctrine can be a convenient and
useful means of serving the legitimate business needs of a seller while
evading the uncertainty of the legality of territorial restrictions. More-
over, the existence of this alternative could permit the Supreme Court
to declare territorial restrictions illegal per se.
CUSTOIER RESTRICTIONS
In both the White Motor case and the Snap-On Tools case, restric-
tions were placed in the dealer agreements which precluded the dealers
from selling to certain large accounts, mainly federal, state and mu-
nicipal governments, unless permission was received from the manu-
facturer. The justice department has claimed for many years that this
practice of restricting customers to whom a dealer can sell is also illegal
per se.3 4 There is no doubt that a manufacturer can reserve the right
to sell to certain customers, but the main question which arises is whether
he can go further and prohibit the dealer to sell to the customers. In
United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co.,35 a price-fixing case, the
Court used language which would prohibit a manufacturer from limiting
the customers to whom a dealer may sell.
A distributor of a trade-marked article may not lawfully limit
by agreement, express or implied, the price at which or the per-
sons to whom its purchaser may resell, except as the seller moves
along the route which is marked by the Miller-Tydings Act. 6
Though the language concerning the prohibition on restricting the cus-
tomers to whom a dealer can sell was dictum in the case, the Govern-
ment has used it for declaring these restrictions per se illegal. The manu-
facturer's major argument in favor of restricting dealer sales to large
accounts such as federal and state governments is that since there are
such large and lucrative accounts, the manufacturer cannot take a
chance on the dealer servicing these accounts in an unsatisfatory man-
ner. They claim these sales are so highly competitive, that to properly
compete, the manufacturer must retain the right to make these sales
himself. Nonetheless, it is this writer's feeling that these restrictions
will ultimately be declared per se illegal. In a concurring opinion in the
White Motor case, Justice Brennan stated:
34 See Letter of Lawrence E. Walsh, Deputy Attorney General, June 20, 1958,
in Automobile Distribution, Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Inter-
state and Foreign Commerce, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 65-66 (1958) ; Statement
of Stanley N. Barnes, Assistant Attorney General in Charge of the Anti-
trust Division, Automobile Marketing Legislation, Hearings Before a Sub-
committee of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Comnzerce,
84th Cong., 2d Sess. 359-365 (1956).35 United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., supra note 28.
38 Id. at 721.
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The customer restraints would seem inherently the more dan-
gerous of the two, for they serve to suppress all competition be-
tween manufacturer and distributors for the custom of the most
desirable accounts. At the same time they seem to lack any of the
countervailing tendencies to foster competition between brands
which may accompany the territorial limitations. In short, there
is far more difficulty in supposing that such customer restrictions
can be justified.37
In Justice Brennan's opinion the only way this restraint could be up-
held, is by showing that the dealers could not have effectively competed
with the manufacturer anyway. Justice Brennan stated: "On trial, as I
see it, the Government will necessarily prevail unless the proof warrants
a finding that, even in the absence of the restrictions, the economics of
trade are such that the distributors cannot compete for the reserved
account."38 The manufacturer is naturally in a much more favorable
position to make the sales to these large accounts because the cost of the
product is greater to the dealer. That this is not always the case, how-
ever, was seen in United States v. Kearflax Li 2en Looms, Inc.39 In that
case the manufacturer's dealer on two occasions underbid the manu-
facturer on sales to the Government. When the manufacturer forbade
the dealer from bidding on these Government contracts, the district
court held that the company violated section 2 of the Sherman Act4 0
since the company had a complete monopoly on the particular product.
This case clearly shows that there can be effective competition between
a dealer and a manufacturer.
In addition to Justice Brennan's concurring opinion, three Justices
speaking through Justice Clark dissented. In stating that the customer
restrictions were per se illegal, Justice Clark declared:
But the rule of reason is inapplicable to agreements made
solely for the purpose of eliminating competition. . . To ad-
mit, as does the petitioner, that competition is eliminated under
its contract is, under our cases, to admit a violation of the Sher-
man Act. No justification, no matter how beneficial can save it
from that interdiction. 41
It is hard to see how these customer restrictions can be upheld. They
prohibit all competition between the dealer and the manufacturer, and
are not justified, as the territorial restraints might be, by the fact that
they spur inter-competitive dealings. Even Justice Brennan's argument
that these restrictions may be legal if the dealer could not in fact com-
pete against the manufacturer seems to be without basis, since if a
3 7 White Motor Co. v. United States, supra note 1 at 272 (concurring opinion).
38 Id. at 275.
39United States v. Klearflax Linen Looms, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 32 (D. Minn. 1945).
40 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. 2 (1958).
41 White Motor Co. v. United States, supra note 1, at 281 (dissenting opinion).
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dealer cannot effectively compete against the manufacturer, there is
absolutely no reason for including such a restriction. 42
This discussion of territorial restraints and customer limitations has
been confined to their effect as individual restraints. However, a warn-
ing must be noted based on United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co.
We think that where a distribution system exists, prior to
the making of such price maintenance contracts, which is illegal
because of unallowable price fixing contracts and where that
illegality necessarily persists in part because a portion of the
resales are not covered by the "fair trade" contracts, as just ex-
plained, subsequent price maintenance contracts, otherwise valid,
should be cancelled, along with the invalid arrangements, in order
that the ground may be cleansed essentially from the vice of the
former illegality. Equity has power to eradicate the evils of a
condemned scheme by prohibition of the use of admittedly valid
parts of an invalid whole. 43
Thus, even though a certain restriction, for example, a territorial re-
striction, would ultimately be held legal by itself, it may be illegal when
combined with other restraints. The Supreme Court in the White Motor
case specifically recognized this rule by stating:
In any price-fixing case restrictive practices ancilliary to the
price-fixing scheme are also quite properly restrained. Such was
United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707, where
price-fixing was an integral part of the whole distribution sys-
tem (id. 720) including customer restrictions. No such finding
was made in this case; and whether or not the facts would permit
one we do not stop to inquire.44
Since the White Motor case also involved price-fixing, it is possible
that the case might eventually be decided on the basis of Bausch & Lomb.
The Snap-On Tools case also involved price-fixing. But while the order
of the Commission was not based on the illegality of the individual
restraints, but rather on the basis that as a whole they must be out-
lawed, the circuit court refused to treat the restraints in toto, but con-
sidered each one individually.
CONCLUSION
It would be an understatement to say that the White Motor case has
left much confusion concerning the legality of territorial and customer
restrictions. The Supreme Court has still reserved for itself the right
to declare either or both of these restrictions illegal per se. And it is
noteworthy that three Justices out of the eight who heard the case
(Justice White did not take part in the case) felt that both of these
42 It is possible that the Supreme Court could hold customer restrictions per se
illegal, but recognize an exception when the evidence discloses that the dealers
could not in fact compete against the manufacturer. See note 15 supra
43 United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., supra note 28, at 724.
4 White Motor Co. v. United States, supra note 1, at 260.
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restrictions were per se illegal, while Justice Brennan in his concurring
opinion intimated that customer restrictions had little justification and
were probably per se illegal. Customer restrictions do not appear to have
any major favorable aspects. About the strongest argument against their
being declared per se illegal is that, generally, these restrictions do not
have the effect of restraining competition because dealers cannot ef-
fectively compete with the manufacturers anyway. But even this point
is hard, if not impossible to prove, and appears to have little merit.
The territorial restraints stand on a somewhat different footing
though. The Court could have declared these illegal per se by equating
vertical territorial restraints with other cases which have held that both
vertical price-fixing and horizontal divisions of markets are per se
illegal. But the Court refused to go that far. If it can be shown that the
legitimate objectives of territorial security agreements outweigh the
concomitant restriction on intrabrand competition, the territorial re-
straints might survive a test of per se illegality, although they would
still be subject to the rule of reason. The key in either respect will be
to show that the intrabrand competition, which was lost, was not as
beneficial as the vigorous interbrand competition which resulted from
the distribution policy. However, until a final decision is rendered on
this subject, companies wishing to initiate territorial restraints would
be in a far safer position if they chose alternatives, such as, exclusive
distributorships or the assignment of areas of primary responsibility.
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